Horgan (2011a) also uses epistemic indicators of phenomenal consciousness to argue for cognitive phenomenology. He argues that since partial zombies without cognitive phenomenology are imaginable and phenomenally differentiated from us, we have cognitive phenomenology. Feelings and experiences are very different. For example, I walk my fingers on sand paper, I feel a skunk, I feel acute pain in my finger, I seem to see light purple, I am extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the object of a mental state with a very pronounced subjective character. It is something, as for me, to undergo any state, a certain phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use the term “qualia” (singular `quale`) to refer to the introspective phenomenal aspects of our mental life. In this broad sense of the word, it is difficult to deny that it exists. Disagreement generally focuses on the mental states of qualia, on whether qualias are intrinsic qualities of its wearers and, like Qualia, has to do with the physical world, both inside and outside the head. The status of quali is much discussed in philosophy, especially because it is essential for a correct understanding of the nature of consciousness. Qualias are at the heart of the problem of mind and body. The reductive versions of the PIT and the PIT are incompatible: if consciousness is reduced to intentionality, then intentionality is not reduced to consciousness and vice versa.
However, the PIT and constellation versions, which are not reductive, are compatible. It is customary to combine the two points of view: many SUPPORTERS of PIT are also in favour of a version of the madness of representation and claim that all phenomenal states are also states of representation (Horgan and Tienson 2002, Graham, Horgan and Tienson 2007, Pautz 2010, Mendelovici 2013, 2018, Bourget 2010). In the other direction, constellationnalism, as we understand it, is attached to the weak PIT, because it implies that certain intentional states are phenomenal states. Objections to Qualia`s figurative opinions are often framed in the form of so-called counter-examples. One class of them consists of cases where, as they say, the experience has the same representative content, but another phenomenal character. Christopher Peacocke cites examples of this kind in his 1983. According to some (z.B block 1990, Shoemaker shortly), the Inverted Spectrum also provides an example that falls into this category. Another class consists of problematic cases where the experience would have different representational content (of the same nature) but have the same phenomenal character. Ned Blocks Inverted Earth (1990) is of this type. The latter only threaten a strong constellationism, the former aim to refute constellationnalism in its strong and weaker forms. Sometimes counter-examples are also given of supposed experiences in one way or another, but where there is no state with the content in question.
Swampman (Davidson 1986) – the molecular replica molecule of one of us, which is formed at random by the chemical reaction that occurs in a marsh when a partially submerged wood is struck by lightning – is a counter-example, according to some philosophers. But there are more mundane cases. Consider the exogenous feeling of depression. It seems that this has no figurative content. As well as the exogenous feeling of joy. But these experiences are certainly phenomenally different. The ITI faces principled challenges and empirical challenges.